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Rights, Human Rights and

A Critical Sociology of Law: Three Way Stretch

RICHARD R WEINER,
.

RHODE ISLAND COLLEGE /

MINDA DE GUNZBERG CENTER FOR

EUROPEAN STUDIES AT HARVARD
PRESENTED AT THE CARR CENTER FOR HUM AN RIGHTS POLICY
AT THE KENNEDY SCHOOL OF
GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY [13 APRIL 2012]
ARGUING FOR A TRANSNATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENT INCREASINGLY POSES
TRANSNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS AS TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS.
SOCIOLOGICALLY, HOW CAN SUCH TRANSNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS BE SECURED
BY INSTITUTIONS AT A GLOBAL LEVEL? MOVING FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS? A SEEMING APORIA BETW EEN THE CONCEPTS
OF LABOR RIGHTS AND HUM AN RIGHTS CAN BE DIALECTICALLY M EDIATED BY
THE TRADITION OF A CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAW IN YIELDING A CRITICAL
SOCIOLOGY OF RIGHTS.

Labor rights and human rights differ as concepts and as movements. Human rights
discourse has often been problematic for labor rights. Human rights seem to be
universalizing in their justification and application of procedural protections for individuals
vis à vis states. Labor rights are associated with a sense of reciprocal solidarity; they are tied
to a universalizing class consciousness and commitment to workplace democracy as the
centerpiece of social democracy. Thus labor rights are not only protective, they are as well
facilitative. And unlike, labor rights, human rights do not question fundamental economic
relations.
Labor rights are a sub-class of social rights. For T. H. Marshall (1950), social rights –
beyond civil rights and political rights – are understood as taming market forces as an
essential condition for a just society. Specifically, how to give workers a human rather than
a purely market identity. How to give humans full membership in society. In so doing,
Marshall does not make a case for subverting capitalism. However, social rights represent
modifications imposed upon the class system on the grounds that the obligations of contract
need to be constrained by claims of justification. Underlying social rights are not natural
rights, but the equal social worth of each human being.
Social rights are not merely understood as Bismarckian social protections by a welfare
state: not as entitlements for those who have failed. They are to be linked to a notion of
reciprocal solidarity, rather than to administrative law. Rather they are to be understood as
inclusive membership rights (Bryan Turner) where Habermas (1999) specifies “the
inclusion of the Other” as a precondition for human mutual recognition and mutual care. In
such intersubjectivity, one person – to paraphrase Cohen and Arato ( 1992) -- can put
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himself or herself in the place of the Other, grasp the Other’s latent need and manifest
claims, as well as constitute or reaffirm commonalities or reciprocal solidarity. This is
without – to recall Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice (1984) – necessarily involving either
the sharing or liking of the Other’s values.
These membership competences are not – as Günther Teubner emphasizes –are not just
another juridified set of collective rights to be administered. Rather they constitute a critical
model navigating the normative foundational and institutional practices: critically
evaluating norms amidst contractual governance regimes.
As opposed to the chimera of natural rights theory (e.g., Figgis, Gewirth), human rights,
labor rights and social rights are institutional facts. They are claims to actualizable
institutional practices assuring care and well-being in a society. They are claims grounded
in a theory of rights as social constructivism as well as in the Declaration of the Rights of
Man rootedness in humanity’s potential.
To talk of human rights, labor rights and social rights is to speak of the social nature of
human beings and the collective practices they create. Each can be understood as what
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum understand as rights to self development. There is a
focus on the capability for people to act through institutionalizing practices – including
policy practices – to promote the freedom and opportunity to seek after those public goods
that each person feels will promote their own flourishing as a human being with human
rights.. The social self cannot develop outside society’s practices of distributive opportunity
of life chances: which determine who we are and are able to be, who we might be.
For Rainer Forst (2012) – following Kant and Habermas – the ultimate criteria for human
rights, labor rights and social rights are reciprocity and generalizability within power
structures of justification, that is, legitimation. This presupposes the possibility of free and
equal participation and adherence to policy procedures of deliberation and decisionmaking. There is, Forst argues, a grounding of justifying reasons in the normative space we
as actors open up in the reciprocity and generalizability with which we justify our respective
conditions in diverse moral contexts in relation to others affected. And how we orient
ourselves in the restrictive space of reasons of several different social lifeworlds.
A person is to be respected as someone who is worthy of being given adequate reasons for
actions and norms that affect him or her in a relevant way. This involves the right to be
respected as an independent social agent who at the same time codetermines the social
structure of which he or she is a part.
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Human rights are not understood as birthrights but rather as claims for human dignity to
be achieved through the struggle of social movements to construct context-transcending
reference points to ground those engaged in critical reasoning and criticism of social norms.
Dignity is not understood metaphysically. Rather, dignity is a social relational term that can
only be ascertained by way of discursive justification: providing the justifying reasons that a
person is to be worthy of being given adequate reasons for actions or norms that affect him
or her.
Human rights are predominantly understood by Western societies as natural rights.
However, developing societies meeting annually at The World Social Forum in Porte Alegré
interpret human rights as social rights: procedural social rights to equalize opportunities
and life chances; substantive social rights to attain equality of effect. Further, social
movements manifest our capacity and capability to engage in the interrogation of justifying
reasons.
For Iris Marion Young (1990), a right is (1) a relationship within a complex configuration of
institutional arrangements; and further (2) a “subject position” of necessary valuational
space. Rights are understandable as an ensemble of legitimations constituted discursively as
interpretive schemes characterizing how we experience our structural positions within “the
social.” A “right” is a capacity to engage in the interrogation of justifying reasons.
“Subject positions” themselves contribute discursively in response to structural positions
within “the social.” We draw upon subject positions as legitimating claims in our
experiencing structural positions within the social. We are not just bearers of supports; we
are also actors who make claims employing signifiers of justification.
Following the arguments of Habermas in Between Facts and Norms (1992/1996), Rainer
Forst argues that the only utopian perspectives we can “straightforwardly” maintain now
are of a procedural nature, with emancipation located in a juridico-discursive order -- an
argument with which Gilles Deleuze concurred. Argumentation forms -- and their
manifestation in institutionalizing/ institutional practices –- serve as the vehicles by which
we extend the institutionalizing dialogue of deliberative justification into the market place,
into the laws, into governance.
The earlier Frankfurter Schüle critical theorist Theodor Adorno spoke of traces and
semblances of a tradition of discourse associated with an emergent practice of justification.
These traces ghost the future. They draw on the categorical framing of a democratic
imaginary in its historical struggles, in its immanent commitments.
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In their recent book The Idea of Labour Law (2011), Guy Davidov and Brian Langille
remind us of the powerful juridico-discursive tradition of the critical sociology of law(which
we will refer to as CSL) associated with the Weimar labor lawyers. This is a tradition which
sees labor law in its wider constitutional function regarding the defense of human dignity
and human emancipation within the socio-economic sphere. It is rooted in the pluralist
jurisprudence of associations of Otto von Gierke (1841-1921) and Harold Laski at the
London School of Economics (1875-1950). This is a jurisprudence that starts with a
pluralism of consociates constructing intersubjective forms of reciprocal solidarity as
autonomous social law. It paralleled the institutionalist theory of labor law and labor unions
by John R. Commons at the University of Wisconsin, Madison (1862-1945). These Weimar
Labor Lawyers included Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945), Hermann Heller (1891-1933), and
Franz Neumann (1900-1954) and Otto Kahn-Freund (1900-1979) who succeeded Laski in
labour law at the LSE. Their movement in the sociology of law is being advanced in
Germany by the third generation Frankfurter Schüler Günther Teubner (also holding
Kahn_Freund’s LSE chair in labor law) as and the journal Kritische Justiz; as well as in
Canada”s Osgoode Hall Law School with Harry Arthurs and Peer Zumbansen.
CSL needs to be distinguished as a movement from the American Critical Legal Studies
(CLS) movement (associated with Duncan Kennedy). As Roger Cotterrell (1987:212-213)
has noted CLS seems primarily concerned with demystifying the claims of legal doctrinal
rationality, and unconcerned either: (1) with understanding the role of legal doctrine as an
unfolding rational structure or system; or (2) with constructively developing any “general
theories about the nature of doctrine in its institutional contexts.”
The Weimar Labor Lawyers assigned CSL an even more comprehensive task than the
philosophy of law. Regulative values are not understood as being located beyond interaction
– beyond experience. CSL emanantes from the “ constitutive” philosophical tradition of
Hegel: which Georg Lukacs interpreted as the Konstitutionsfrage of Sittlichkeit (Collective
Ethical and Legal Life) in the institutional practices of a civil society -- as the heart of the
Frankfurt School Critical Theory of Society.
Contrary to Max Weber’s own more neo-Kantian proceduralist turn – or for that matters
Hans Kelsen’s – this critical rules jurisprudence is not divorced from communicative/
discourse ethics and is ultimately rooted in evolving practical reasoning in the social
lifeworld. The legitimation of law and rights occurs not on the basis of natural law nor on
abstract principles of markets, but on the basis of a procedural rationality which is
continually institutionalized in practice.
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CSL is a theory of justification legitimation grounded in actors’ valuation of what is
justified. Habermas and Forst understand valuation as grounded in the right to
justification. This is a justification immanent within the mutual recognition of citizens
connected to the socially bonding/ binding elocutionary force inherent in their informed and
reasonable communicative interaction and deliberation.(See Baynes, 1995: 213-224.) Human
rights and labor rights as social rights ought to involve processes of reaching a mutual
understanding: ought to involve warranted claims as part of a reciprocal solidarity.
Labor rights and human rights as social rights, are jsutufucations/legitimations based on
standards that are neither external or extrinsic, but are articulated in what Gillian Rose
(1984) aptly labeled the Court of Reason and the procedures institutionalized within it.
There all claims, legitimations, and justifications are tested against the validity claims of
rational argumentation
The institutionalizing practices of the claims of labor rights and human rights reflect the
discursive struggles of pluralist Social Subjects of Rights, rather than a Hegelian-Marxist
notion of a Social Subject of Right. This is an understanding of the warranted assertions of
social movements rather than some singular organized historical agent.
What makes CSL critical is its grounding of sociologic in ultimately categorical
transcendent logic. As Gillian Rose (1984: 211) continues to argue, sociologic cannot relieve
the categorical transcendental logic of the “unending” trial of reason” – the ultimate
touchstone of critique by which institutional development can be analyzed.
Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger (1986) present an approach of “institutional
normativism” (IN) that goes beyond Habermas’s procedural normativism and natural
law/natural rights theory. IN focuses on institutionalizing warranted assertions that can be
gleaned in institutionalizing practices. These institutionalizing practices are associated with
social movements can be understood as “institutional facts.” They are the discursive
manifestations of our valuative commitments to a substantive reordering within social
movements: claims which can be appreciated as emergent “forms of life.” The focus is on
traces and semblances of the stillborn, the unborn, or the not yet actualized institutionalizing
practices.

These practices contain within them the claims of practical reasoning: that can be
understood as a constellation of action-related arguments along an arc of subject positions.
Ideas associated with these warranted assertions and institutionalizing practices are not to
be bracketed out as they have been by Karl Mannheim-engendered sociology of knowledge.
Rather they are to be subject to interrogation and rational reconstruction as forms of
practical reasoning -– to use the approach of Habernas and Forst. This is a critical
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approach to social movements which uncovers the normative potentialities made available
by collective learning processes, and are scanned for realizability.
What are studied are governance rationales used in practices, rather than natural rights
idealizations. These are studied not in terms of apriori categorical of procedural legitimation
that precede cultural perceptions or legal meanings, but as discursive theoretical terms that
come to be translated as institutionalizing practices.
We look beyond “interestedness” toward “committedness” – towards commitments and
justifications involved in institutional and institutionalizing practices, understood –
following MacCormick and Weinberger --as an ontology of institutional facts. These are
unbracketed warranted assertions boiled off from their institutional and institutionalizing
husks.
These commitments and justifications are understood as:
•
•
•
•

derived from deliberation as an effect – as a discourse finds its own subjects;
answering practical questions and testing the justificatory dialogic claims of an
unredeemed predicate logic beyond a foundationalist procedural approach;
arguments emergent and immanent within an arc of path-shaping – and not merely
path-dependent – institutionalizing practices; and
as intersubjectively justified/legitimated substance within its own internal principle –
its own entelechies along its arc of subject positions. (Cf. LaTorre, 1990.)

A critical political sociology of social movements of the kind developed by Alain Touraine
(1981) goes beyond the “applied” practical knowledge involved in the application of
dominant justifications/ legitimations used by policy-makers. Rather, such a critical political
sociology studies what people invariably do in those circumstances when they choose rather
than comply and apply. In The Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin referred to these social
movements as a swelling: that is, a displacing and superimposing of a threshold that occurs
when confronting a seeming aporia.
Margaret Somers and Christopher Rogers (2006:460) pointedly observe that a critical
sociology of rights (CSR) must navigate between normative regulation, foundationalism and
the empirical political sociology of social movements. Like CSL, CSR poses critical
junctures of contingent emergence – of warranted assertions of justification within a Court
of Reason.
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Following the institutional normativism (IN) of MacCormick and Weinberger above, we
can pose the related CSR and CSL problematic as a grounding of critical theory between a
discourse of justification and an ontology of institutional facts. In posing these aligned
problematic, we can understand how they help mediate and transcend the aporia of labor
rights and human rights. See Figure 1 just below.

A CSR must be understood with regard to the traditional Easton/Almond functional
analysis framing (derived from Robert K. Merton) of needs, of wants, of demands, and of
claims. CSR and any concept of human rights goes back to the level of needs and their
justified remediations. This is what Bryan Turner (2006) labels the level of vulnerabilities
and exclusions.
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Turner argues that out of the vulnerabilities and exclusions, humans develop remedial and
protective institutional practices of care. He starts from four foundational philosophical
assumptions:
•
•
•
•

the vulnerability of human beings as embodied agents;
the interdependency and inter-relatedness of we humans;
the general relations of reciprocity engendered by the intersubjectivity of the social
lifeworld; and
both the fragility and precariousness of social institutions, and the extent to which
they are inclusive or exclusive.

Labor rights, social rights, and human rights are institutional facts. They are claims to
actualizable institutional practices assessing care and well-being in society. CSR can be
understood as a theory of agency following the Human Development and Capability Theory
of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. As discussed above. Sen and Nussbaum provide an
approach grounded in both a theory of human rights as social constructivism as well as in
The Declaration of the Rights of Man rootedness in humanity’s potential. Indeed, the
International Labor Organization (ILO) is increasingly “seen as a law and development
institution” (Langille, 2005:436).
Needs are to be recognized as claims that are to be institutionally mediated and adjudicated.
Following Habermas’s developing critical theory of the universal pragmatics of Interaktion
Kompetenz in the 1980s -- and anticipating where Habermas was taking it – Cohen and
Arato (1992:383-384) pose this ultimate Hegelian rather than Kantian problem: the mutual
recognition as the foundation of the Sittlichkeit of civil society.This is also the touchstone of
the Weimar Labor Lawyers’ CSL
We can establish that the principle of human rights as rights to participate in the
development of our norms to protect and enable ourselves. This principle
•
•

entails the requirement of mutual respect and of mutual aid when needed and
practicable; and
is a principle of reciprocal solidarity as well.

Hence a CSR is rooted in social movements and institutional/ institutionalizing practices
responsive to need of capability, vulnerabilities, exclusions as well as both associationability
and consequent memberships. And Günther Teubner connects CSR with CSL, and in so
doing both mediates and transcends the two aligned approaches and the associated concepts
of social law and social rights that constitute together the fulcrum.
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Social rights involve membership competences and mutual recognition for collectively
providing social protection. These membership competences are not – Teubner emphasizes
– merely another juridified set of collective rights to be administered. Rather they constitute
a normative model – and indeed a critical model evaluating norms themselves – amidst
nested transational scales of contractual governance regimes. This is the auctoritas of
groups’ self-regulatory practices of negotiation and cooperation.
Teubner demonstrates sociologically the impossibility of steering society from a single
center of control without regressive de-differentiation within the complexity of the evolved
division of labor.
Further, Teubner then links this sociology to procedurally establishing norms of
membership rights and competences that democratically constitute participation in the
decision-making practices of nested self-regulatory regimes.
Teubner (1997; 2004; 2007) and Zumbansen (2009) detail what Harold Laski AND Philip
Selznick in the first half of the twentieth century referred to as autonomous private law and
social law made by collective organizations of enabled group rights (heterarchy) rather than
by state-centered regimes (hierarchy). This is a mixed regulatory landscape of hard law and
soft law, private specialized courts and arbitration tribunals, and self-regulatory
associational networks on the enterprise level. Hybrid contractual governance meshwork
emerges – often between social subsystems. These are hybrid networks of standards and
codes regulating not only traditional commercial enterprises and their labor relations, but
as well: E-commerce, fund-raising chains, just-in-time systems. They are a meshwork of
justifications. Attempts to constitutionalize membership competences and mutual
recognition in the regulation of trade link corporate law to labor law, and then link both to
human rights law. Montesquieu and Braudel redux.
We are witnessing in our globalized capitalism, the emergent formulation, codification and
monitoring of transnational standards and protocols. These normative practices are
elaborated and institutionalized not through collective bargaining between employers and
employees, but by the discretion of corporations and increasingly internationational
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). As a result, there is a weakening of any sense of
protective law regime as a transnational standard-setting challenges the power of regimes of
domestic labor.
Labor regulation operates less through the sovereign power of states than through the
dispersed multi-level meshwork in which there is a shift from the language of rights to the
language of standards and corporate codes of social responsibility. These include standards
of freedom from forced labor; as well as standards pertaining to maximum hours, freedom
to work, vacations, minimum wages, safety and health. Both labor and human rights
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movements pressure transnational corporations to imbricate their corporate policies,
practices, and routines which then “percolate across borders like green shoots” (Hepple,
2004; Arthurs, 2009).
Labor rights and human rights increasingly converge. There has been an increasing focus
on labor rights in the transantional context by INGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International and Human Rights First. And there has been a blossoming of non-union
transnational organizations like the Fair Standards Association, the Workers Rights
Consortium and the International Labor Rights Forum.
The adoption of labor unions of human rights discourse and an interlinked “labor rights
and human rights” agenda has been motivated by a union strategy to reverse a decline in
membership, grow international members in organizing campaigns. And bolster both
intellectual and political support. Human rights is the lingua franca of global struggles.
(See Kolben:2010.)
There are tensions between labor rights trade union movements and human rights-oriented
INGOs.
•

•
•
•
•

Labor law discourse focuses on arguments about fairness and power, whereas
human rights movements attempt to construct narratives that are universalizing and
transcending vis à vis the grievances of everyday worklife.
Labor unions have not always sought to achieve human rights and have excluded
categories of peoples.
As a result, INGOs have had to step into the void as advocates.
INGO leaders have to increasingly accept a class basis of exploitation in the global
economy, beyond masks of race and gender.
Unions have to bring themselves beyond an exclusive goal of getting bigger pieces of
the pie for their members.

On the other side, labor union leaders ask INGO leaders:
•
•
•
•

Who elected you?
To whom are you accountable?
Who finances you?
Don’t you recognize that some INGO objectives deflect or de-rail union organizing
efforts?

Further, human rights INGOs are staffed with mostly privileged young people coming from
elite schools and independent wealth subsidizing their relatively low pay. Labor
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unions are substantially staffed by rank-and-file staff and labor lawyers committed to the
inter-related labor and social democracy movements.
Human rights INGOs often have condescending relationships with union activists ans show
no appreciation of the organizing ideals of workplace democracy and co-determination
(Mitbestimmung as institutionalized since the 1970s in Germany). Further, labor
responsibilities involve more than appeals to principles; they involve intersubjective normcreation, obligation, and self-regulation.
We are led to our ultimate puzzles:
First, can these two respective emancipatory social movements ally with each other as well
as with information access movements to counter managerial modes of regulation on a scale
not seen since the 1920s and 1930s? There is not only corporate self-management; there is
also co-determination labor law practices involving workers and stakeholders.
Second, can we come to see labor rights as global membership rights? Not in a strong
register of the right to have states create jobs? But in a lower key. One where labor rights in
a globally interconnected network can secure the right to be treated fairly in the work-place
and can ensure that minorities are not excluded from employment.
Here are some of the strategic institutionalizing practices that are being discussed in alliance
efforts of trade unions and INGOs as both human development and capability as well as
human rights movements. Both cannot ignore the underlying independent variable that is
the international/transantion division of labor in its constraining forces on any concept of
citizenship rights we can divine or create.
•

•
•
•

•

	
  

Where union organization is not possible for a variety of reasons and causes – or has
yet to be achieved – unions reserve the right to speak on workers’ behalf before the
International Labor Organization (ILO).
INGOs can assist in the organization of “informal workers” in cooperation with the
trade union movement.
Trade unions themselves have created their own auxiliary development INGOs. (See
Figure 2 just below.)
Trade unions and INGOs can form networks of normative regulation and advocacy
that go beyond mere alliances of social movements in organizing workers, in getting
the inclusion of “social clauses” in free trade regulatory constitutions, and in looking
beyond the organization of workers as ddues-paying members and tackling the
problems of poverty.
INGOs leaders need to accept class bases of exploitation in the global economy, as a
determinant independent variable that goes beyond masks of race and gender.
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Unions need to join INGOs in also adding “social clauses” to the World Intellectual
Property Organization protocols to overcome the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provisions of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that restrict poor countries’ access to medication and health research.

Ultimately, we ask:
•

•

	
  

Can trade unions and INGOs work together ? :
(1) To strengthen the negotiating capacity and capability of developing countries ?
(2) To build social clauses recognizing the necessary polycontexturality of
endogenous forces that envelop and impact any respective pact of commercial
regulation?
Can we reconnect social law, social rights, labor rights and human rights in a
mediating and transcending transnational critical sociology of rights ?

FIGURE 2
DEVELOPMENT INGOs COLLABORATING
WITH LABOR UNIONS
ASSOCIATION QUEBECOIXE DES ORGANISME DE
COOPERATION

www.aaoci.qc.ca

NORWEGIAN PEOPLE’S AID (NPA)

www.napid.org

SOLIDAR

www.solidar.org

NEW ECONOMICS FOUNDATION

www.neweconomics.org

IRASE (Brazil)

www.balancosocial.org.br

CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN

www.cleanclothes.org

CORP WATCH

www.corp.watch.org

ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE

www.ethicaltrade.org

SOCIETAL ACCOUTNING/ SA 8000

www.sa8000.org

BUSINESS HUMAN RIGHTS

www.business-humanrights.org

CATALYST FORUM

www.catalystforum.org

CIVICUS: WORKD ALLIANCE FOR CIVIC
PARTICIPATION

www.civicus.org

FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION

www.fairlabor.org

FREDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG (FES)

www.fes.de

FOCUS ON THE GLOBAL SOUTH

www.focusweb.org

GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR WORKERS &COMMUNITIES

www.theglobalalliance.org

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ALLIANCE (ICA)

www.coop.org

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF WORKERS
EDUCATION ASSOCIATIONS (IFWA)

www.ifwea.org

MAQUILA SOLIDARITY NETWORK (MSN)

www.maquilasolidarity.org

NATIONAL LABOR COMMITTEE FOR WORKERS &
HUMAN RIGHTS (NLC)

www.nlcnet.org

SELF-EMPLOYED WOMEN’S ASSOCIATION (SEWA)

www.sewa.org

STREETNET

www.streetnet.org.za

WOMEN IN INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT:
GLOBALIZING & ORGANIZING (WIEGO)

www.wiego.org

WOMEN WORKING WORLDWIDE (WWW)

www.poptel.org.uk/women-ww/
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